Sub-state entities in EU law: changes and challenges by Verdelho Alves, Maria Luísa
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1 . In a “post-state” era, sub-state political communities face new 
challenges . Modern constitutionalism resorted to various political and 
territorial forms to ensure the autonomy of certain social communities; 
in many cases, uniting different nations under the same State . But 
the integration of States into transnational political communities had 
profound implications on the sub-state levels of government . In the 
European context, it is now widely recognized that the process of 
integration unleashed centripetal forces .
This article revisits the effects of European integration in the internal 
distribution of powers and examines the novelties introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty regarding the position, the powers, and the rights of sub-
state communities in EU Law .
2 . European integration impacted on the political organization of the 
Member States both horizontally and vertically . 
It should however be noted that the design of the internal structure 
of powers varies considerably in the Constitutions of the Member States 
of the Union and therefore the effects of the European integration on the 
internal separation of powers are also very different . Nonetheless, it is 
possible to lay out some grand lines .
The impact of the European integration on the horizontal separation 
of power, i .e . the balance between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches, has been explained in some detail in the literature . Doctrinal 
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studies on Constitutional Law and Political Science have analysed this 
issue in great depth, bringing to light a general tendency: on the one 
hand, the strengthening of the executive in relation to the legislative 
power; on the other hand, the empowerment of the judiciary . 
3 . At a vertical level, the relationship between the central state 
and infra-state entities – federated states, autonomous regions – also 
underwent transformations due to the European integration process, 
which led to the accentuation of centralizing tendencies .
It is not hard to see why the integration process triggered these 
centripetal forces . It is well known that the conferral of powers on the 
Union has resulted in a limitation of the Member State powers and, to a 
degree varying with the terms of the internal distribution of powers, has 
also invaded the powers of the sub-state entities, at both the legislative 
and the executive levels .
However, in the institutional design of the Union, these communities 
are represented only in the Committee of the Regions, which is an 
advisory body, vested only with consultative powers2 . The prominent 
position in the legislative process is attributed to the Council, a body 
which is composed of one representative from each Member State at 
ministerial level . Efforts have been made, in the successive revisions 
of the Treaties, to defend representative democracy, and this resulted 
in a growing extension of the powers of the European Parliament, and, 
more recently, in the reform agreed in Lisbon Treaty, in the involvement 
of national parliaments in the legislative process of the Union3 . But 
2 The Committee of the Regions was established by the Maastricht Treaty . It is one of the EU 
Advisory Bodies . According to Article 13 (4) TEU: “The European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and Social Committee and a Committee of 
the Regions acting in an advisory capacity .”
The obligation to consult the Committee of the Regions is established in several areas: 
Transport: Article 91TFUE; employment: Article 148 TFUE; social policy: Article 153 TFUE; the 
European Social Fund: Article 164 TFUE; Education, vocational training, youth and sport: Article 
166 TFUE; culture: Article 167 TFUE; public health: Article 168 TFUE; trans-european networks: 
Article 172 TFUE; environment: Article 192 TFUE; energy: Article 194 TFUE .
3 See, generally, Article 12 TUE and the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union . As regards the involvement of national parliaments in monitoring compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, see Article 5 (3) TUE, Article 352 (2) TFUE and the Protocol 
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the Council continues to occupy the prominent position in the Union’s 
legislative process . This means that the conferral of powers on the Union 
involves the central governments being given power over matters which, 
in some constitutional systems, belonged to the sphere of intervention 
of sub-state communities . Also, the continuous enlargement of sphere 
of competence of the European Union, and the changes that have taken 
place in the European governance model, with the development of a 
composite administration, had severe implications for the executive 
prerogatives of sub-state entities .
What is more, the appointment of representatives to the Committee 
of the Regions remains in the hands of the Council and the Member 
States4 . As HOPKINS notes, “in most cases, representatives came from 
local and regional levels with some purely national appointees”5; only 
strong regions, de iure or de facto, have been capable of ensuring their 
presence on the Committee . 
4 . In legal literature, the response to the loss of powers of infra-state 
entities due to the evolution of the integration process follows two main 
lines . 
Some authors take the view that the problem should be addressed 
at national level . It is submitted that it is for the Member States’ legal 
systems to ensure the effective participation of these communities in EU 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty 
of Lisbon .
4 Article 305 TFUE reads as follows:
“The number of members of the Committee of the Regions shall not exceed 350 .
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision 
determining the Committee’s composition .
The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members shall be appointed 
for five years. Their term of office shall be renewable. The Council shall adopt the list of 
members and alternate members drawn up in accordance with the proposals made by each 
Member State . When the mandate referred to in Article 300(3) on the basis of which they were 
proposed comes to an end, the term of office of members of the Committee shall terminate 
automatically and they shall then be replaced for the remainder of the said term of office in 
accordance with the same procedure . No member of the Committee shall at the same time be 
a Member of the European Parliament .”
5 HOPKINS, W . John – A Tale of Two Europes: European Regions from Berlin to Lisbon. Austra-
lian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 2010, 55 et . seq ., at 60 .
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affairs; i .e . in the elaboration of the government’s position on Union affairs 
or in the national implementation of Union law . 
In the debate that accompanied the last revision of the treaties, 
DÍEZ-HOCHLEITNER argued that the time had not yet come to “introduce 
the regional dimension into the competencial system of the Union”6 .
In L. PIRES’ opinion, a «structural congruence» is needed between 
the constitutional developments of the Member States and the EU7 . 
And indeed some legal systems (for example: the German, the Italian, 
the Spanish and the Portuguese) already recognize infra-state entities 
participation rights in matters of European policy: the right to be heard; 
the right to information; the right of initiative8 . Some legal systems 
also ensure the representation of infra-state entities in the national 
delegations involved in the European decision-making process .
Other scholars, while recognizing that it is the responsibility of the 
Member States to ensure the effective participation of these entities 
in drawing up government positions in EU affairs or in the national 
implementation of Union law, argue that relying on the domestic political 
systems is insufficient and call for a greater protection of infra-state 
entities by European Union law . In other words, these authors consider 
that infra-state entities must be granted the adequate instruments to 
voice their demands and defend their interests at EU level . 
Supporting this view, in the course of the preparatory work leading 
to the last revision of the Treaties, CONSTANTINESCO wrote: “one wonders 
if it would not be appropriate to mention in the Treaty, that these entities 
exercise powers that the subsidiarity principle is intended to protect 
and if it should not then be established that those entities may bring 
6 Vide DÍEZ-HOCHLEITNER, Javier – El futuro del sistema competencial comunitário: algunas 
propuestas de reforma, in GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, Eduardo (Dir .) – La encrucijada constitucional 
de la Unión Europea . Madrid: Civitas, 2002, 85 et seq ., at 102 and 108 .
7 Vide PIRES, Francisco Lucas – Prefácio: A caminho de uma Constituição Política Europeia?, 
in LUSTER, Rudolf – União Europeia Um Projecto de Constituição. Sindelfingen: Editora Libertas, 
1989, 9 et seq . at 21-22 .
8 Vide HUBER, Peter M . – Estatalitad abierta: Un análisis comparado, in BOGDANDY, Armin 
von; CRUZ VILLALÓN, Pedro e HUBER, Peter M . (eds .) – El Derecho Constitucional en el espacio 
jurídico europeo . Valência: Tirant lo Blanch, 2013, 69 et seq ., at 106; regarding the portuguese 
system, see: MARTINS, Ana Maria – A Participação as Regiões Autónomas nos Assuntos da 
República . Coimbra: Almedina, 2002 .
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an action for annulment of a Community measure before the Court of 
Justice if it infringes their own prerogatives, as recognized by the national 
constitution?”9
In the same vein, the Committee of the Regions put forward several 
proposals to amend the text of the treaties as regards the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice, relaxing the standing requirements both for itself 
and for sub-state entities with legislative powers10 . 
5. In the Treaty of Lisbon we find traces of these last positions. The 
new formulation of the principle of subsidiarity makes a reference to the 
“regional and local level” . Article 5 (3) TEU states:
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level .”
The Protocol on the application of subsidiarity and proportionality 
also makes a reference to the “regional and local dimension”. For the first 
time, EU primary law ensures the consultation of sub-state entities in the 
development of EU law . Pursuant to Article 2: 
“Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely . 
Such consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional 
and local dimension of the action envisaged . In cases of exceptional 
urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such consultations . It shall 
give reasons for its decision in its proposal .”11
9 Vide CONSTANTINESCO, Vlad – Brève note sur répartition des compétences comme clé de la 
future constitution européenne ?, in Mélanges en hommage à Guy Isaac, Tome 1 . Toulouse : 
Presses de l’Université des sciences sociales de Toulouse, 2004, 155 et seq ., at 161 .
10 See, for example: Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the revision of the Treaty 
of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community CdR 136/95, OJ 
1996 C 100, p . 1; Resolution of the Committee of the Regions on the next Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC), CdR 54/99 FIN, OJ 1999 C 293, p . 74 .
11 Protocol 2, Article 2, emphasis added .
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Without diminishing the importance of these developments, one 
should remember, as HOPKINS rightfully notes, that “the subsidiarity 
gains of the Lisbon/Convention process are only potential gains and 
everything will depend upon how they are applied in practice”12 .
6. More significantly, the Treaty of Lisbon did not go as far as some 
scholars and the Committee of the Regions had proposed regarding infra-
state entities direct access to the Court of Justice to ensure that the 
principle of subsidiarity is upheld; i .e . to control if the objectives of the 
Union’s proposed action would not be better ensured at regional and local 
level .
As is well known, unrestricted access to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for judicial review of Union acts is guaranteed only for 
the so-called privileged applicants, listed in Article 263 TFUE, second 
paragraph: the Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission . Natural and legal persons enjoy a more restricted right 
to bring proceedings that needs to satisfy the conditions laid down in the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFUE . 
The issue of individuals’ access to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union under Article 263 TFUE has been the object of an intense 
academic debate13, and, in the past, different interpretative positions 
were developed by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
12 Vide HOPKINS, W . John – A Tale of Two Europes: European Regions from Berlin to Lisbon . 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 2010, 55 et . seq ., at 67 .
13 For a more thorough treatment and further references, see MARTINS, Patrícia Fragoso 
– Rethinking Access by Private Parties to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Judicial Review of EU Acts before and after the Lisbon Treaty . Lisboa: Universidade Católica 
portuguesa, 2016; PAIS, Sofia Oliveira – A protecção dos particulares no âmbito do recurso 
de anulação depois de Lisboa: Breves reflexões, in Estudos de Direito da União Europeia . 
Coimbra: Almedina, 2012, 95 et seq .
Specifically on the locus standi of sub-state entities in EU Law, see THIES, Anne – The Locus 
Standi of the Regions before EU Courts, in PANARA e BECKER (eds .) – The Role of the Regions 
in EU Governance . Berlin: Springer, 2011, 25 et seq; VAN NUFFEL, Piet – What’s in a Member 
State? Central and Decentralized Authorities before the Community Courts . Common Market 
Law Review, 2001, 871 et seq; ZAMPINI, Florence – A propos du droit au juge d’une entité infra-
étatique, de la responsabilité de l’État et de la coopération loyale ..., in Mélange en hommage 
à Guy Isaac, 50 ans de droit communautaire, Tome 2 . Toulouse: Presses de l’Université des 
Sciences Sociales, 2004, 655 et seq .
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(now General Court)14, which ended in the Court of Justice statement 
that the principle of effective judicial protection cannot have the effect of 
setting aside the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 
263 TFUE15 . Finally, the Lisbon Treaty amended the text of the treaties 
as regards individuals’ standing to bring actions for annulment . Pursuant 
the new text of Article 263 TFUE, fourth paragraph:
“Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed 
to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and 
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not 
entail implementing measures .”
As before, non-privileged applicants may challenge EU acts not 
addressed to them only if they demonstrate that they are directly 
and individually concerned by the measure which they are seeking 
to have annulled . But in addition to that, this newly draft provision 
gives individuals the right to challenge regulatory acts of direct 
14 See the more flexible approach adopted by the Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré and 
the response of the Court of Justice, in appeal, reaffirming the Plaumann ruling .
The Court of First Instance affirmed:
“( . . .) in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, a natural or legal person is 
to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that 
concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which 
is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him”.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 3 May 2002, Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission 
of the European Communities, Case T-177/01, ECR 2002 II-2365, para . 51; Judgment of the 
Court of 1 April 2004, Commission of the European Communities v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA, Case 
C-263/02 P, ECR 2004 I-3425, para . 45 .
See also the critical opinions of some of the Advocate Generals’: opinion of Advocate General 
MAYRAS delivered on 27 June 1973, Merkur v . Commission of the European Communities, 
Case 43/72, ECR 1973 -1055; opinion of Advocate General RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER delivered on 
12 September 1996, Case C-142/95 P, ECR 1996 I-6669; opinion of Advocate General JACOBS 
delivered on 21 March 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union, 
Case C-50/00 P and on 10 July 2003, Commission of the European Communities v Jégo-Quéré 
& Cie SA, Case C-263/02 P, ECR 2004 I-3425 .
15 See, Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 1 April 2004, Commission of the European 
Communities v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA, Case C-263/02 P, ECR 2004 I-3425, para . 36; Judgment 
of the Court of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union, 
Case C-50/00 P, ECR 2002 I-6677, para . 44 .
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concern to them which do not require implementing measures16, 
abandoning in these cases the requirement of individual concern . 
A textual reading of the provision already indicates that the Lisbon 
reform maintained the restrictive approach in relation to the right of 
action of individuals, and, as a result, some gaps of protection still 
persist . As MARTINS rightfully noted: “although Article 263 (4) TFUE 
has reduced the possibilities of gaps of judicial protection in the EU, it 
has not eliminated all of them”17 .
7 . The question arises then: do infra-state entities enjoy the same 
legal standing of Member States, as privileged applicants? Do they enjoy 
the same general right of access to the Court to defend the interests of its 
territory? Or must they be treated as individual applicants, being able to 
challenge the measures they consider detrimental to their interests only 
in the narrow limits in which individual applicants can do so? 
According to settled jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the 
term “Member State” within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU refers only to “the governmental authorities of the 
Member States”18 . Following the Court’s explanation, that term can 
16 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ for the 
purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering “all 
acts of general application apart from legislative acts” (See Order of the General Court of 6 
September 2011, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, Case T-18/10, ECR 2011 II-5599, confirmed by Judgment of the Court, 
3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, Case C-583/11 P, Digital reports, para . 58) .
For a broad interpretation of Article 263 (4) TFUE, in the light of the principle of effective 
judicial protection, see MARTINS, Patrícia Fragoso – Rethinking Access by Private Parties to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. Judicial Review of EU Acts before and after the 
Lisbon Treaty, op . cit, at p . 495 . 
In the author’s view: “the term «regulatory acts» included in Article 263 (4) TFUE should be 
deemed to include all Union measures which are adopted under the form of regulation or 
which perform some sort of regulatory function regardless of their form and of the procedure 
for their adoption” .
17 Idem, p . 476 .
18 See: Order of the Court of 21 March 1997, Région wallonne v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case C-95/97, ECR 1997 I-1787; Order of the Court of 1 October 1997, Regione 
Toscana v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-180/97, ECR 1997 I-5245; Order 
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not be interpreted as covering also the governments of the regions or 
other local authorities of the Member States without prejudice to the 
institutional balance provided for in the Treaty19 . It follows that the locus 
standi of the infra-State authorities can be assessed only in the very 
restrictive terms of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which, as 
seen above, requires proof that the applicants are directly concerned 
and, in some cases, also individually concerned by the measures they 
intend to annul .
8 . One example, among many, with the additional interest of 
involving a Portuguese region20, may serve as an illustration of this line 
of case-law21 .
The Azores brought an action for annulment seeking partial 
annulment of a EU Regulation, which had been adopted with the favourable 
vote of the Portuguese government22 .
Following the expiry of the transitional period provided for in the 
Act concerning the conditions of accession of Spain and the Portugal, 
of the Court of First Instance of 12 March 2007, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T-417/04, ECR 2007 II-641; Judgment of 
the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 May 2006, Regione Siciliana v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case C-417/04 P . European Court Reports 2006 I-3881 .
19 RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER rightfully notes that, in certain contexts, the Court of Justice has 
adopted a loose interpretation of the term State . For example: as regards direct effect of 
Directives, the Court considers that the term includes any body, whatever its legal form, which 
has been made responsible for providing a public service and has for that purpose special 
powers beyond those which result from the rules applicable in relations between individuals . 
In the Advocate General’s words: “the Court has followed a variable geometry approach, which 
changes according to the field under consideration and exhibits the pragmatism employed to 
secure the effectiveness of Community law, in order thus to satisfy the desire for integration 
inherent in the Treaty .”
See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 12 January 2006, Regione 
Siciliana v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-417/04 P, ECR 2006 I-3881, 
paras 40 et seq, para . 43 .
20 As regards the form of State, Portugal can be characterized as a unitary State, partially 
regional . Portuguese Constitution admits two political and administrative autonomous 
regions: Azores and Madeira .
21 See Order of the Court of 26 November 2009, Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the 
European Union, Case C-444/08, ECR 2009 I-200 .
22 Council Regulation (EC) 1954/2003 of 4 November 2003 . OJ 289, 7 .11 .2003, p . 1-7 .
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the contested Regulation introduced a new fishing effort management 
system for the Union waters in the North-East Atlantic, which included 
the waters of the Azores (the exclusive economic zone of the Azores 
extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the islands of the 
archipelago) . The Regulation established the procedure to be followed for 
the adoption of a Regulation fixing the maximum annual fishing effort for 
each Member State, and provided the following:
“In the waters up to 100 nautical miles from the baselines of the Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands, the Member States concerned may restrict 
fishing to vessels registered in the ports of these islands, except for 
Community vessels that traditionally fish in those waters in so far as these 
do not exceed the fishing effort traditionally exerted.”
The basic concern of the Azores’ authorities was the opening of 
fishing for deep-sea species in the waters of the Azores to non-Portuguese 
vessels . They feared that the access of Spanish vessels to those waters 
would put at risk fish stocks, and argued that the Regulation would have 
harmful effects on the specific marine environment of the Azores and, 
consequently, also on the economy of the Azores region .
In its ruling, the Court of First Instance, confirming previous case-
law, observed that, under the system established by the Treaties, 
governmental authorities of the Member States alone, and not 
regional authorities, had locus standi to defend the general interest 
in their territories . It is for the authorities of the State to represent 
these interests, regardless of the constitutional form or the territorial 
organisation of the State . Therefore, the Azores should be treated as a 
private applicant, whose right of action is dependent on the requirement 
of direct and individual concern23 .
When assessing these requirements, the Court noted that legal 
persons acting under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC (now Article 
263 TFUE), may not, in order to show that they are individually concerned 
by a Union act, rely only on the consequences of that act on the collectivity 
or the entirety of its members . The general interest which a region may 
have in obtaining a result that is favourable for its economic prosperity is 
23 Case C-444/08, cit above, para . 63 .
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not sufficient on its own to enable it to be regarded as being individually 
concerned, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFUE .
Accordingly, the Court found that the action for annulment brought 
by Azores was inadmissible .
9 . There is extensive literature and case-law on the interpretation of 
the concepts of direct and individual concern, which raise serious issues, 
far from resolved, that cannot be addressed within the confines of this 
article . 
It suffices to note that in the case-law of the Court of Justice standing 
requirements of private applicants, specially the test of individual 
concern, are narrowly construed . 
In light of the case-law of the Court of Justice, the test of direct 
concern requires: first, that the measure directly affects the legal situation 
of the individual and, secondly, that there should be no discretion left to 
those responsible for its implementation24 .
In assessing individual concern, the Court of Justice further requires, 
since Plaumann, that the contested act “affects the applicants by reason 
of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation 
which differentiates them from all other persons”25 .
It should be noted, however, that among the criteria on the basis 
of which the existence of an individual concern can be determined, the 
Court has already included the effect of a Union act on the powers of an 
infra-State entity . In the Azores decision, the Court considered that this 
case-law did not apply to the circumstances of the case . But in Land 
Oberösterreich, the Court of First Instance recognized that the Land 
Oberösterreich had locus standi because the contested decision had the 
24 Judgment of the Court, 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-583/11 P, Digital reports, para . 16 .
On the interpretation of this concept in assessing a sub-state entity standing, see Judgment 
of the Court of 2 May 2006, Regione Siciliana v Commission of the European Communities, 
Case C-417/04 P, ECR 2006 I-3881, paras . 21, 24, 30 .
25 See, inter alia, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1963, Plaumann & Co . v Commission of 
the European Economic Community, Case 25/62, English special edition 1963, 95; Judgment 
of the Court, 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, Case C-583/11 P, Digital reports, para . 71 . 
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effect of preventing the exercise of its own powers conferred on it by the 
Austrian constitutional order26 . Consequently, it may be necessary to 
enquire whether the contested provisions affects the scope of powers of 
the infra-state entity .
Despite these developments, the constitutional rules of internal 
division of powers can not, by itself, support the right of access to the 
Court of Justice of the sub-state entities .
Nor can it be anticipated that the case-law of the Court will evolve 
towards the recognition of a right of access of the infra-state entities to 
the Court of Justice in terms comparable to that of the States .
Such a broad configuration of sub-state entities active locus standi 
as regards action for annulment would certainly open the door to the 
recognition of their passive locus standi in infringement proceedings 
under Articles 258 to 260 TFUE, and this would remove the responsibility 
of States for non-compliance attributable to sub-state entities . 
Stated in simple terms, if one allows those communities access to 
the Court of Justice of the EU as plaintiffs, to defend their interests and 
their sphere of competence, one must also admit that they can be sued 
in the Court of Justice when the breach of EU law is attributable to them27 . 
In the end, giving sub-state entities privileged status in access to the 
annulment action would jeopardize the effective application of Union law .
Also, as LOUIS argues – with good reason –, recognition of the legal 
standing of sub-state entities would require the Court to rule on  internal 
conflicts that must be resolved by constitutional type instruments28 . 
26 See Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 5 October 2005, Land Oberösterreich and 
Republic of Austria v Commission of the European Communities, Joined cases T-366/03 and 
T-235/04, ECR 2005 II-4005, para . 28 .
27 In support of a revision of the Treaty, in order to allow the monitoring of compliance with 
Union law by infra-State entities in the context of infringement proceedings, vide GIL IBÁÑEZ, 
Alberto J . – The “Standard” Administrative Procedure for Supervising and Enforcing EC Law: EC 
Treaty Articles 226 and 228 . Law and Contemporary Problems, 2004,135 et seq, at . 151-154 .
28 LOUIS, Jean-Victor – La Cour de Justice après Nice, in DONY, Marianne e BRIBOSIA, 
Emmanuelle (eds .) – L’avenir du system juridictionnel de l’Union Européenne . Bruxelles: 
Institut d’Études Européennes, 2002, 5 et seq, at 17 .
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10 . True, there are alternative routes to EU Courts . 
It should first be mentioned the possibility of indirect review of EU 
measures through the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 
TFUE . 
There is also the possibility, opened by the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 
8, paragraph 2, of the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality29), that the Committee of the Regions, in 
which these sub-state entities are represented, brings an action under 
Article 263 TFEU on the grounds of breach of the principle of subsidiarity 
in respect of legislative acts the adoption of which the Treaty requires the 
Committee to be consulted30 .
Last, though not least, national legal systems can also contribute to 
ensure sub-state entities a wider access to EU justice . German and Italian 
legal systems already do so by requiring State authorities to challenge at 
the Court of Justice EU measures that put at stake the interests of the 
Länder and the regions .
11 . This last observation further corroborates the conclusion already 
brought to light by the antecedent discussion: sub-states entities’ 
involvement in the EU affairs is still largely dependent on the political and 
constitutional prerogatives that some of these entities enjoy under their 
national constitutional systems . 
Nonetheless, the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, in 
particular, the insertion of the local and regional dimension into the 
concept of subsidiarity, and the granting of access to the Court of Justice 
to the European regional institution, the Committee of the Regions, for 
actions alleging a breach of subsidiarity, open new promising perspectives 
for the future role of sub-state entities in the European political landscape . 
29 Vide JEFFERY, Charlie e ZILLER, Jacques – Le Comité des régions dans la mise en oeuvre et 
le contrôle des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité à la lumière de la Constitution 
pour l’Europe. Bruxelles, Comité des Régions, 2006 .
30 Pursuant to article 263 TFUE, third paragraph, the Committee of the Regions has also 
access to actions for annulment for the purpose of protecting its prerogatives . The Committee 
of the Regions and the European Central Bank are considered semi-privileged applicants . 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe already recognised this prerogative . See Arti-
cle III-365(3) of the Constitutional Treaty .
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